Abstract. Research on organizational discourse typically reduces it to what members do when producing and using texts in organizational
articles Fairhurst et al., 1987) , genre analysis (Geisler, 2001; Winsor, 2000; Zachry, 2000) , conversation analysis (Boden, 1994; Parker et al., 1995; Tulin, 1997; Woodilla, 1998) , or narrative analysis (Boje, 1991 (Boje, , 1995 Boje et al., 1997; Czarniawska, 1997a,b; Gabriel, 1998; Robichaud, 1998 Robichaud, , 2001 Robichaud, , 2002 Robichaud, , 2003 Taylor and Lerner, 1996) , studies devoted to this topic unveil the important role language plays in the constitution of organizations. Though scholars do not always agree about whether or not discourse can be considered foundational vis-a-vis organizational forms (Reed, 2001 ), the discursive turn shows that the (oral, written, or even iconic) texts produced by organizational members are consequential regarding issues of power relationships, effectiveness, or control.
However, despite this growing interest in discourse and its consequences for organizational life, very few studies focus explicitly on the agency of organizational texts.
1 Research on organizational discourse typically reduces it to what employees or managers do when they produce and use texts, and fails to recognize that texts, on their own, also make a difference. This essay focuses on the active contribution of texts (especially documents) to organizational processes; that is, on the ways that texts, such as reports, contracts, memos, signs, or work orders, perform something.
Unlike other approaches reviewed in this issue, this perspective decenters the focus on agency and human activities by casting texts as a mode of being of organization. This stance is often invisible because of the vocabulary that analysts and practitioners use to describe organizational activities. As Smith (2001: 171) rightly notes, 'For the most part the textual dimensions of organization are buried in . . . standard nominalizations.' In other words, most scholars, including those interested in organizational discourse, take objects such as 'organization,' 'coordination,' or 'institution' for granted without acknowledging that these processes are reconstituted as entities whose origins need explanation (see Smith, 2001: 168) . Reflecting on textual agency consists of adopting a performative view of organizations (see also Taylor and Van Every, 2000: 157-9) , that is, one that highlights how organizational activities become stabilized and repeated over time (Strum and Latour, 1987) .
Organizations and institutions clearly exist, but our task as analysts is to interrogate their modes of being through questioning what produces these stabilizing and channeling effects that characterize organizational life (Latour, 1996b) . By focusing on textual performance, we challenge our overreliance on face-to-face interaction and show that texts contribute to the local translocation of constraints and abilities (Smith, 1984) . Thus, texts are not foundational; however, they participate, like other agents, in the daily production of organizational life.
After reviewing writings on textual agency, I discuss how we can ascribe to texts the capacity of doing something without falling into animism. Then I use Searle's (1979) well-known classification of speech acts to explore the different types of action that texts perform. Finally, I
Organization 11(3) Articles return to the constitution of organizations, that is, to what extent textual agency redefines the mode of being of organizational forms.
Why Organizational Texts Matter: A Brief Literature Review
Even though organizational sciences rarely address the question of textual agency, several studies on genre analysis explore this topic. Based on Miller's (1984) classic essay on genre as social action, some scholars focus on the organizational role of generic texts such as work orders (Winsor, 2000) , checklists (Bazerman, 1997) , records (Schryer, 1993) , or memos (Yates, 1989) . Whether designed to control employees' behavior (Yates, 1993) , coordinate activities from a distance (Law, 1986) , or insure public accountability (Geisler, 2001) , the mere presence of these texts makes a difference in organizational life, often triggering specific behaviors. As Bazerman notes:
The airline pilot's checklist before takeoff structures talk with the copilot, navigator, and ground crew; enacts directives from the legal and regulating bodies overseeing flight; establishes a record of actions taken by the flight crew; and provides a task-oriented frame for interpreting other recordings of conversation and instrument readings. Further, the checklist regularizes and structures the procedures of the takeoff, the perception and inspection of instruments and the physical environment, and the manipulation of the aircraft and its control. (1997: 296, emphasis added) Even though Bazerman never addresses the question of textual agency, we see how he links texts to actions. Checklists structure talk, enact directives, establish records, provide task-oriented frames, as well as regularize procedures, perceptions, and manipulations. Organizational activities, then, are discursively structured, which means that text in all its forms (written, oral, iconic) can display a form of agency, that is, it can make a difference.
Similarly, Winsor (2000: 157) shows how the activities of laboratory technicians are 'preorganized by engineers through the genre of the work order.' Work orders are discursive tools that both activate and conceal the work that blue-collar technicians do (2000: 157). However, Winsor treats the work order as a genre, not an agent. In other words, the work order is primarily an intermediary between the engineers and the technicians and not an agent that performs actions. Yet textual agency is implicit in her analyses as she notes:
Everyone in the organization could recognize a work order from that social action even if the orders were handwritten, say, or the instructions were bunched into a paragraph. Work orders, then, are aimed at shaping the technicians' actions and, by means of those actions, shaping the physical devices they work on so that data can be gathered. (Winsor, 2000: 169) Thus, recognizing the role that work orders play amounts to ascribing, even indirectly, a form of performativity to these documents. Work orders perform social actions repeatedly through setting the technicians' tasks.
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Genre analyses in organizational studies then demonstrate how textual responses are produced and reproduced to address typical organizational situations (Miller, 1984; Yates, 1993) . This work clearly recognizes the role that texts play in the constitution of organizations, but it does not develop the extent to which texts display agency.
Action and Agency: A Reconceptualization
Pleading for a concept of textual agency calls into question more than two thousand years of reflection on the notion of action. But this reconceptualization can be defended rationally. To demonstrate, I turn to everyday usage-more precisely, definitions found in the dictionary that show how this term is used in everyday conversation.
So what lexicon is aligned with the word 'action'? Eight definitions, with the oldest recorded meaning coming first, are proposed in the 1993 edition of the Webster's New Encyclopedic Dictionary:
1: a proceeding in a court of justice by which one demands or enforces one's right or the redress or punishment of a wrong 2: the working of one thing on another so as to produce a change <the action of acids on metals> 3: the doing of something usually in stages or with the possibility of continuation <the action of singing> 4 a: a thing done: deed b pl: behavior, conduct c: readiness to engage in daring activity: initiative <a person of action> 5: combat in war 6: the unfolding of the events of a drama or work of fiction: plot 7: an operating mechanism <the action of a firearm> 8: an area or state of vigorous activity <where the action is> (1993: 11) Interestingly, none of these definitions refers explicitly to the concept of intention, which several authors use traditionally to define a true 'action' (e.g. Austin, Burke, Davidson, and Searle, to name just a few). Moreover, two definitions (2 and 7) are perfectly compatible with the idea of a nonhuman agency exerting action, as we speak of 'action of acids on metals' or 'action of a firearm. ' Besides these nuances, the term 'action' refers to the production of some kind of change (definitions 1 and 2), the doing of something (definitions 3, 4b, 5, 6, 7 and 8) , the result of a doing (definition 4a), or the initiation of a doing (definition 4c). Whether performed by humans or nonhumans, 'action' in ordinary language refers to the accomplishment of something under the angle of its transformative (change), durative (ongoing process), inchoative (beginning), or terminative (ending) dimensions (Greimas and Courtés, 1982) . In these cases, we delimit or circumscribe something that is currently happening or has happened. Since we can de-fine it, we can also identify its beginning and its end, i.e. its inchoative and terminative dimensions. This 'something' that we identify is the production of change, that is, the transformation from one state to another (Cooren, 2000a,b; Taylor, 1993; Taylor and Cooren, 1997) .
An action then is a transformation of state operated by an agent. This transformation can exhibit reflexivity (e.g. 'Robert is walking' or 'this Organization 11(3) Articles machine is running'), transitivity (e.g. 'Nancy is eating an apple' or 'this acid is attacking metals'), or even ditransitivity (e.g. 'Denis is talking to Helen' or 'this ATM is providing Garry with $100') (Taylor and Van Every, 2000) . Although using the term 'action' to refer to what an ATM machine does could be considered hubristic, this exclusion may in fact explain why analysts have neglected the role that nonhumans play in our everyday world (Latour, 1993 (Latour, , 1996b (Latour, , 1999 .
To say that nonhumans do things does not mean that human contributions are passed over. As Latour (1993 Latour ( , 1996b notes, the key phenomenon is hybridicity; that is, the recognition that action has no point of origin. Arguments for and against gun control in the United States illustrate this concept. The National Rifle Association's argument focuses on the human being who is holding the weapon. For them, people kill people and guns are reduced to mere instruments, 'neutral carrier of will' (Latour, 1994: 31) . Advocates of gun control respond with the slogan, 'Guns kill people ' (1994: 30) , which focuses on the difference a gun makes in somebody's hands. Without the gun, killing someone becomes harder. Thus, humans exchange properties with nonhumans. As Latour points out, You are different with a gun in hand; . . . the gun is another object because it has entered into a relationship with you. The gun is no longer the gun-inthe-armory or the gun-in-the-drawer or the gun-in-the-pocket, but the gunin-your-hand, aimed at someone who is screaming. What is true of the subject, of the gunman, is as true of the object, of the gun that is held. (1994: 33) Both humans and nonhumans contribute to what is happening. The gun and the gunman both make a difference and it is their association that becomes the origin to action.
Recognizing nonhuman agency does not reduce human agency to an empirical artifact. On the contrary, it shows how a hybrid association between humans and nonhumans enables people to do things that they could not do otherwise. A focus on nonhuman agency paves the way to recognizing hybrid agency; that is, the way humans can appropriate what nonhumans do. They exchange properties with each other: the gun is different in a person's hand, just as the person is different with the gun in his hand. Knowledge of this hybrid relationship helps us understand the role that texts play in structuring organizational settings.
Textual Agency
How can we analyze discursive acts in organizations by focusing on the agency displayed by the (oral, written, or iconic) texts?
2 Even though other scholars acknowledge the agency role that machines, instruments, and tools play (Callon, 1986; Callon and Latour, 1981; Callon et al., 1986; Latour, 1986 Latour, , 1993 Latour, , 1994 Latour, , 1996a Latour, ,b, 1999 Latour and Woolgar, 1986) , this
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article focuses on how this role enables the functioning of texts, especially as they connect with organizing.
For ordinary language philosophers, the analysis of textuality starts with human speakers who carry specific intentions and perform particular discursive actions in a given circumstance (Austin, 1962 (Austin, /1975 Searle, 1969 Searle, , 1979 Vanderveken, 1990-1) . These scholars use hypothetical cases in which the speakers either meant what they said (direct speech acts) or used indirect ways to convey their intentions (indirect speech acts) to account for communication. In other words, these analyses tend to make texts or utterances almost invisible.
However, if we agree with Latour (1996b) that, when one acts, others proceed to action, then we should be able to recognize the status of these 'others' when people communicate with each other, whether they do this orally, graphically, or by sign. For example, in a research project that shadowed a manager's routine activities, one particularly striking practice was the number of notes this manager wrote to himself when something had to be done (for example, calling back a tenant, checking on the price of something, calling a contractor). As soon as the manager identified a task 'to be done,' he simply wrote a note on a Post-it. Each time he went back to his office, he reviewed these notes and acted on some specific task (i.e. calling a tenant, a supplier, or a contractor) while postponing others. Once the task was completed, the note was simply dropped in the garbage can.
One interpretation of this practice is that these notes reminded the manager what needed to be done. Another possible read, as speech act theorists would claim, is that the manager performed the act of reminding himself. This interpretation, however, overlooks the contribution that notes make to this process, or the role of nonhuman agency. Certainly, the manager orients to and functions with his own notes (not the notes written by someone else). However, the actions of reminding oneself involve the participation of nonhuman actors, i.e. the notes. If the notes were not doing anything, they would not make a difference in the situation, and yet their mere presence is enough to trigger the manager's behavior.
Furthermore, saying that the notes remind him what to do is not incompatible with saying that the manager reminds himself what to do with the help of the notes. In the second account, the notes function as an intermediary or a simple tool whose agency is ignored. In this account, the manager appropriates what the notes are doing. What the notes are doing (reminding) becomes what the humans who produced them are doing. The first account, the one I would like to privilege, highlights the contribution of the notes. Because of their durability (they last, endure, remain-properties that human memory lacks), notes do things that managers rely on in their daily activities.
Appropriation and its mirror concept, attribution, are core phenomena that provide insights into this mundane example. The concern is what is Organization 11(3) Articles done when a text is appropriated by or attributed to someone. In the case reviewed, the action of reminding attributed to the note can also be attributed to the manager. Consistent with Latour's (1994) concept of hybridicity exemplified in the gun control debate, the manager supplemented his limited capacity to recall by associating himself with the notes he created. By appropriating the agency of the notes, he becomes more powerful. But this power derives from the capacity of the notes to do things that humans alone do poorly, that is, reminding or recalling something throughout space and time. Through this appropriation, the manager's memory is increased, which aids in structuring different activities. In effect, programs of actions can be recalled any time the manager decides to look at his notes.
This effect of appropriation/attribution goes even further. For instance, a security system was installed at the entrance of the manager's building a few months after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. To access their offices, all the tenants now have to swipe a card in a machine. If they go through the security device without using their card, an alarm automatically goes off to warn personnel. A sign displayed in the hall says, 'All visitors must sign in. This building is under TV surveillance.' Each time a new visitor comes into the building, this sign invites the person to check in with the concierge of the building. The visitor checkin consists of (1) explaining the reason for the visit, (2) having a camera take a photograph of the person's face, and (3) automatically recording the sound of the person's voice when the concierge asks for her name. That way, if anything happens, anyone who has access to the building can be identified.
The sign in this situation displays agency in that it invites the visitor to check in and it indicates to them that the building is under video surveillance. By implication, the organization that manages the building can also be said to perform the acts of inviting and indicating. Thus, the actions of the sign can be attributed to and/or appropriated by the organization, which co-constitutes the sign. In like manner, organizational forms function as de-authored texts (Hoskins and McLean, 1998) , in that traces of authorship tend to be erased from these texts. Most organizational forms that people fill out display the same kind of characteristics: passive sentences, the absence of any reference to 'I' or even 'we,' and a series of directives that indicate where and how to complete the form (for more details, see Yates, 1993) . This 'ghost-writing,' as Hoskins and McLean call it, reduces the human actor to an intermediary, thereby reaffirming the existence of the organization. Like forms, the sign at the building entrance acts on behalf of or in the name of the organization, and not necessarily on behalf of the person who produced it. The inscriptions, documents, and graphs produced in the organization's name attest to the identities of collective actors, even when their very existence is questionable. 
In some cases, the discourse shifts our attention to the ghost or the originator of the actions. For example, use of the pronoun 'I' is reserved for human actors and its use shifts our attention away from the text to whomever appropriates it. When these shifters pop up in a text (whether orally or in writing), they make us look for the ghost who might appropriate the speech act. In this case, shifters signal 'action at a distance'; they point to the human who is speaking through the text.
This discussion of textual agency incorporates human involvement into this performance. It shows how the human who produced and designed texts can act from a distance across space and time. The sign displayed in the lobby helps the personnel in charge of organizational entry to instruct visitors without reiterating the same information each time a new person enters the building. A hybrid agent composed of security personnel and the sign tells people what to do and gives them information. Without the presence of personnel to reinforce the injunction, the sign might be useless or powerless; visitors might disregard it. Using Latour's (1994) terminology, the sign-in-the-presence-of-thepersonnel is a more powerful mode of communication and the personnelwith-the sign reiterates the sign's injunction.
Recognizing textual agency moves organizational discourse analysts beyond their preoccupation with face-to-face communication. Instead of focusing on what members say, we focus on the oral, written, or iconic texts that they produce and how these texts span space and time. Furthermore, these texts, especially when they become more autonomous (such as policies, contracts, forms), reaffirm the identity and existence of the organization. The sign in the lobby of the building not only acts in the name of security personnel but also acts on behalf of the organization at large. Organizations do things not only through human agents (Taylor and Cooren, 1997; Taylor and Van Every, 2000) , but also through their nonhuman counterparts (documents, machines, technological devices, etc.). Analyzing nonhuman agency (whether textual or non-textual) enables us to reconceptualize organizational ontology; that is, the mode of being and doing of organizational forms. To this end, we address what textual agency consists of-what texts can or cannot do.
What Texts Can Do and Cannot Do
This section focuses on the kinds of speech acts that texts can perform.
Assertives
For example, using the category of assertives proposed by Searle (1979) and Vanderveken (1990-1) , we can note that documents can inform, indicate, say, tell, assert, deny, suggest, predict, and even prophesy (see Table 1 ). For instance, the sign at the entrance of the building informed or told visitors that they had to sign in and that the building was under camera surveillance. Texts can also attest, certify, contradict, refute, Organization 11(3) Articles critique, contest, question, accuse, denounce, or even proclaim, as we see in Table 1 . However, texts are not able to admit, confess, or take pride in doing something. These last verbs point to a human presence that cannot be ascribed to texts and documents. In other words, 'admitting' is a In comparison, we saw that 'recalling' is a speech act that can be ascribed to a text (a Post-it note for example) to the extent that it also displays a form of hybridicity; that is, that this text can be identified as coming from some human or collective agent. Ascribing agency to documents does not mean that texts are severed from their human creators. For instance, if the sign informs visitors, it is because the visitors recognize that organizational members created this notice for this purpose. Ascribing agency to texts never means that humans completely disappear from the picture. On the contrary, textual agency functions to the extent that texts are recognized as being purposely produced for some specific effect. Similarly, if I tell someone that I received a memo announcing John's resignation, I ascribe agency to this memo in that I act as if it is written by someone who is authorized to initiate this notification. The spectral effect, which Derrida (1992 Derrida ( , 1994 has been analyzing using the pun 'hauntology,' never disappears. On the contrary, it is necessary to the functioning of texts.
Commissives
This ghostly effect becomes even more pronounced with the use of commissives such as swearing, taking the oath, accepting, agreeing, consenting, refusing, or betting whose appropriation is denied to documents (see Table 2 ). However, texts, like contracts, commit their signatories to do things and guarantee, vouch, or assure specific actions or advantages to some person or entity-for instance, 'this signed agreement promises payment of a sum of money on demand or at a particular time'; i.e. a promissory note. In other words, commitment is not something that a text can do for itself. A document cannot really commit itself to do something, but it can commit for other agents. The agency of such documents exists if they commit their signatories to a particular action in the future.
To illustrate, I refer back to the building manager's daily routines. Each time a manager and one of his contractors verbally agree about a job for a tenant, the contractor sends a formal proposal to the manager. This proposal typically contains details about the pricing, labor costs, and supplies of the job. This proposal then is communicated to the tenant, who approves or disapproves the project. Once both parties sign a contract, this latter commits the contractor and the tenant to specific actions. The contractor is committed to doing the job for the tenant and the tenant is committed to paying the contractor when the job is completed. Saying that the contract commits the contractor and the tenant to specific actions is consistent with saying that both of them commit themselves to act through the contract. Both interpretations are compatible, though the first one highlights the agency of the contract. By creating Organization 11(3) Articles this contract, both parties use this document as a source of agency; that is, it is a text that binds them to specific actions. If the agreement is violated and the dispute goes to litigation, the contract indicates or even proves the respective commitments of both parties.
Directives
If we now turn to directives, some of these discursive actions are restricted to humans: begging, supplicating, imploring, entreating, beseeching. However, some specific types of documents (formal invitations, for example) can request someone to do something. Other texts can also advise, ask, suggest, invite, recommend, warn, but also notify, order, solicit, demand, press, summon, enjoin, forbid, ban, allow, authorize, or stipulate (see Table 3 for some illustrations). Certainly, illocutionary acts such as asking, soliciting, forbidding, banning, allowing, or authorizing can just be performed by documents that have what we call the 'force of law,' i.e. constitutional, legal or official documents, but note that this also applies to any human to whom we would be ready to attribute such a capacity to act. They both need to be recognized.
Work orders fall into this category (Winsor, 2000) . For instance, each time a building manager identifies what one of his employees (i.e. not a contractor) should do, he contacts him 4 verbally and provides him with a brief description of the task and deadline. The manager then asks a 
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secretary to generate a work order with the employee's name and a brief description of the task. The secretary then places the work order in the employee's work tray while keeping a copy of it in her computer. The employee takes the work order and brings it back marked 'completed' once the work is done. The secretary then enters this information into the computer.
As this example illustrates, the work order does not initiate the task, since the verbal interaction between the manager and the employee performed this action. However, it tells or confirms to the employee what tasks have to be done and the manager can use it to check what work has Organization 11(3) Articles or has not been completed. 5 Interestingly, the introduction of computerized work orders makes the employees more accountable vis-a-vis their respective tasks. Employees sometimes ignore or lose the written work orders, claiming that they never received them. Saving the form in the secretary's computer, however, serves as proof that the work order exists and was given to them. This form of control 6 shows how a text, like a work order, makes a difference because it tells, reminds, or confirms to employees what needs to be done and makes them more accountable.
Declarations and expressives
We could follow the same exercise for what Searle calls declarations (see Table 4 ) and expressives (see Table 5 ), noting that texts can confirm, ratify, approve, sanction, exculpate, or compliment. In effect, the list of speech acts typically reserved for human action can be extended (with some restrictions) to the texts they produce. Moreover, documents have properties that humans do not have: Derrida (1988) calls this restance, that is, their 'staying capacity.' For example, when a legal document requests something from someone, this text remains active as long as it is recognized or not destroyed. Thus, what texts and documents do are performances of a particular kind, since their actions last as long as they remain intact or recognized.
Textual Agency and Organizational Constitution
Recognizing the agency of text sets forth a new way to approach organizational constitution and ontology. Some scholars view discourse as the only (or at least the main) building block of organizational forms (Mumby and Clair, 1997; Oswick et al., 2000) , whereas others, such as Fairclough (1992 Fairclough ( , 1995 and Reed (1998 Reed ( , 2000 , refuse to 'collapse' materiality into discursivity (Reed, 2001 ) and contend that discourse should be analyzed as shaped by 'something else,' usually under the form of power, ideology, or domination. The epistemological choice these positions offer is either a socio-constructive approach to reality, in which discourse is seen as a 'filter' through which members' interactions co-construct and coconstitute the organization, or a materialist approach, which conceives of discourse as reflecting something already constituted.
However, recognizing that texts display a form of agency leads to the conclusion that a discursive constitution alone does not make any sense, nor does a reliance on structure and material relations solve the problem; that is, both discursive and material foundationalists seem shortsighted. Rather than addressing the issue as a duality between agency and structure (Giddens, 1984) , we could expand the concept of agency to acknowledge what nonhumans do. The problem with the term 'structure' (as well as nominalizations such as 'organizations' or 'institutions') is that it functions as a hodge-podge concept, in which scholars include an Conversely, the phenomenon of nonhuman agency provides a basis for explaining such constructs as 'structure,' 'organization,' or 'institution.' For example, we saw how a relatively tight form of control emerges from the mere existence and accountability of the work order.
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7 Here, we can explain what is happening without using the term 'structure.' The work order and its specific form of agency account for why this document aids in controlling employees' behaviors. Clearly, a multitude of actors participate in the production and application of the work order to insure its compliance (the manager, the secretary, the computer, the tray); thus, the Instead of reducing the organization to a discursive construction or to a structure, we can acknowledge the contributions that both discourse and texts make to organizational forms.
By developing textual agents, organizational members create ways for such forms to remain stable throughout space and time. For instance, organizational members can address directives and determine their satisfaction from a distance. The complete organization (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson, 2000) thus becomes an organization in which documents state criteria of success (assertives), define objectives (directives), commit employees and managers (commissives), and sanction or reward performance (expressives). Certainly, there are ghostly presences or hybridicity in these texts; humans do not disappear and human appropriation always occurs. But textual agency, especially in its written form, enables delegation through tele-action and tele-communication. By remaining, these textual agents fabricate relatively fixed spaces and times; they define objectives; they forbid specific behaviors; and they invite or enforce humans to follow specific organizational pathways.
Organizing, then, is not simply a process reduced to what human members do, but rather should be expanded to include the hybrid and ghostly effects of nonhuman actions. Recognizing what nonhumans do bridges the gap between the micro and the macro dimension of organizing, since we saw that action, according to this conception, does not have any point of origin. Humans are acted upon as well as acting through the textual and physical objects that they produce. They enter into a chain of actions that extend beyond their original contributions. Instead of using Organization 11(3) Articles the term 'structure' to explain these effects, let us start from agency-in all its forms.
Notes
An earlier version of this article was presented as a keynote lecture at the International Conference on Spacing and Timing, Palermo, Italy, 1-3 November 2001.
1 In The Constitution of Society, Giddens (1984: 14) writes, 'Action depends upon the capability of the individual to "make a difference" to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to "make a difference", that is, to exercise some sort of power.' As we see, Giddens' definition of agency is restricted to what individuals do, that is, to entities displaying a form of intentionality. What I propose is to extend this definition to take into account cases in which other types of entities also appear to make a difference. 2 In this article, I use the term 'text' according to the definition proposed by Smith (2001: 164) : 'definite forms of words, numbers or images that exist in a materially replicable form.' Though Smith seems to think mostly in terms of written texts when she proposes this definition, I think it is not incompatible with the phenomenon of oral texts, given that even these exist in a materially replicable form (they can be remembered and audio-recorded).
What actually defines the notion of text is, according to Derrida (1988) , its iterability, i.e. its repeatability, whether under the form of quotation or mechanical reproduction. 3 In that case, we can speak about a tour de force, as for the US Declaration of Independence, so nicely analyzed by Derrida (1986) . 4 All employees under the building manager's authority were male at the time of the study. They were mostly painters and carpenters. 5 Though the phenomenon of textual agency is not problematized in Tracy's (2000) excellent study of emotional labor practices in cruise ships, she also shows very well how the cruise staff constantly are reminded of their duties by two copies of the service credo that are stuck to the inside of their cabin and bathroom doors. As she writes, 'The Credo included mandates such as "We never say no," "We smile, we are on stage," "We are ambassadors of our cruise ship when at work and at play," and "We use proper telephone etiquette . . . and answer with a smile in our voice" ' (2000: 107) . Not surprisingly, Tracy notes that these copies of the credo contribute to what she calls the 'dispersed emotional control structures' of the cruise ship. 6 Interestingly enough, the term 'control' comes from the Middle-French word 'contre-rolle,' which literally means 'counter-account.' As Levin's book (2000) reminds us, the contre-rolle initially was a register that medieval officials kept to make tax collectors accountable. As a modern form of control, the work order used in the manager's office seems to function literally as a 'counteraccount.' 7 Here, we could refer to what Hoskins et al. call the accounting-led organizations-that is, target-focusing organizations, in which 'success and failure become identified in terms of target-hitting ' (2001: 15) . As these authors mention, accounting makes organizational processes accountable: it
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François Cooren creates ways to check performances and the extent to which these performances meet criteria of success or failure.
